Abstract. We consider prophet inequalities in a setting where agents correspond to both elements in a matroid and vertices in a graph. A set of agents is feasible if they form both an independent set in the matroid and an independent set in the graph. Our main result is an ex-ante 1 2(d+1) -prophet inequality, where d is a graph parameter upper-bounded by the maximum size of an independent set in the neighborhood of any vertex.
prophet inequality, where d is a graph parameter upper-bounded by the maximum size of an independent set in the neighborhood of any vertex.
We establish this result through a framework that sets both dynamic prices for elements in the matroid (using the method of balanced thresholds), and static but discriminatory prices for vertices in the graph (motivated by recent developments in approximate dynamic programming). The threshold for accepting an agent is then the sum of these two prices.
We show that for graphs induced by a certain family of intervalscheduling constraints, the value of d is 1. Our framework thus provides the first constant-factor prophet inequality when there are both matroid-independence constraints and interval-scheduling constraints. It also unifies and improves several results from the literature, leading to a 1 2 -prophet inequality when agents have XOS valuation functions over a set of items and use them for a finite interval duration, and more generally, a
Introduction
Prophet inequalities analyze the performance of online vs. offline algorithms in sequential selection problems, and have enjoyed a recent surge of uses in postedprice mechanism design. The typical online selection problem can be described as follows.
A set of T agents is denoted by N = {1, . . . , T }. Each agent t has a valuation V t drawn from a known distribution F t . The valuations are realized independently, and revealed sequentially. Each agent must be irrevocably accepted or rejected upon her valuation being revealed, with the feasibility constraint that the set of agents accepted by the end must lie in F , a downward-closed collection of subsets of N . The objective is to maximize the expected sum of valuations of agents accepted. We will refer to this as the welfare.
The algorithm's expected welfare is compared to that of a clairvoyant who can see all the realized valuations beforehand and make "prophetic" accept/reject decisions. All of our results also hold relative to the stronger ex-ante prophet, who can choose the correlation between the marginal distributions F 1 , . . . , F T to maximize his welfare (but for the algorithm, the valuations are still independent). We let OPT denote the prophet's expected welfare, which equals E[max S∈F t∈S V t ].
In this paper, we analyze the structure where F is defined by the intersection of a matroid and a graph. Specifically, there is a matroid M = (N, I) and an undirected graph G = (N, E), both defined on the set of agents N . F then consists of the subsets S ⊆ N that are both independent in the matroid, i.e. S ∈ I, and independent in the graph, i.e. {t, t ′ } / ∈ E for all t, t ′ ∈ S. To state our main result, we need the following definitions. 
I = 2
N corresponds to the free matroid, under which all subsets are independent.
Definition 2. For a graph G = (N, E), define
where G[·] denotes the subgraph of G induced by a set of vertices, and α(·) denotes the maximum size of an independent set in a graph.
We explain expression (1) . {t, t ′ } ∈ E implies that t cannot be accepted alongside t ′ , and t ′ < t implies that t ′ could have been accepted before t to "block" agent t. However, some of these agents t ′ may also block each other, in which case they are adjacent in the induced subgraph G [·] . α(·) counts the maximum number of such agents that can be simultaneously accepted, and d 2 (G) takes the maximum of these numbers over t ∈ N . We note that d 2 (G) is upper-bounded by max t α(G[{t ′ : {t, t ′ } ∈ E}]), the maximum size of an independent set in the neighborhood of any vertex. Theorem 1. For any matroid M and graph G, the expected welfare of an online algorithm is at least
Our algorithm is order-aware, in that it needs to assume the agents' valuations will be revealed in the given order 1, . . . , T . Before elaborating on our techniques in Section 1.2, we outline the implications of our Theorem 1 and various generalizations relative to the literature, and describe settings where d 2 (G) is small.
Our Results, in relation to Previous Results
In Theorem 1, d 2 (G) is small if an agent cannot be blocked by many agents that don't block each other. One setting where this arises is when the agents arrive in order 1, . . . , T , each requesting service for a duration starting with her time of arrival, and need to be served by a single server. Formally, associated with the agents are intervals
, and a set of agents S can be feasibly served if
In the graph G induced by constraints (2), two agents are adjacent if their intervals overlap. For an agent t, any agents t ′ < t with I t ′ ∩ I t = ∅ must have I t ′ contain the point ℓ t , since ℓ t ′ ≤ ℓ t and the intervals are contiguous. Therefore, all of these agents t ′ are also adjacent to each other in G through the point ℓ t , which implies that d 2 (G) ≤ 1.
We contrast this with a different type of interval constraint where the agents request service starting from a common point in time ℓ, and there is a timedependent service capacity B(z) ∈ Z ≥0 for all z ≥ ℓ. The agents request intervals
In (3), since the intervals starting from the same point are nested, the constraints can be captured by a laminar matroid M , with d 1 (M ) ≤ 1. Therefore, Theorem 1 shows that the guarantee relative to the ex-ante prophet is at least 1 (d1(M)+1)(d2(G)+1) ≥ 1/4 under the combination of constraints (2) and (3). This could model an online rectangle packing problem, where the horizontal projections have increasing left-boundaries and must satisfy (2), while the vertical projections have identical top-boundaries and must satisfy (3). More generally, Theorem 1 implies a (1/4)-guarantee for any online matroid selection problem under the additional constraint that each agent requires a processing time, during which no other agent can be served even if they are independent in the matroid. To our knowledge, our framework provides the first constantfactor guarantee under the combined families of feasibility constraints. Indeed, the constraints (2) do not correspond to a matroid.
3 Meanwhile, (3) cannot be captured by the pairwise independence constraints of a graph. If E = ∅ and the graph imposes no feasibility constraints, then d 2 (G) = 0 and the guarantee from Theorem 1 is 1/2, which is the matroid prophet inequality from [11] .
In Section 3, we consider the generalized setting studied in [8, 5] , where the agents have XOS valuation functions over a set of items. We impose matroid-and graph-independence constraints on the subset of items allocated to the agents by the end, and show that the guarantee of 1 (d1(M)+1)(d2(G)+1) from Theorem 1 still holds (Theorem 2). If the matroid is free, then d 1 (M ) = 0, and a corollary of Theorem 2 is that the 1 2 -guarantee for XOS from [8] still holds if the agents use the items allocated to them for a finite interval duration (instead of keeping the items forever). More generally, we show that if each item requires a bundle of at most d underlying resources (possibly for a finite interval duration) to procure, then d 2 (G) ≤ d, leading to a guarantee of 1/(d + 1) (Proposition 6).
Our Techniques, in relation to Previous Techniques
Central to the development of prophet inequalities is the notion of a residual function. In the basic setting with an arbitrary feasible collection F , if Y ∈ F is the set of agents that have already been accepted, then its residual is defined as
whereṼ 1 , . . . ,Ṽ T is a freshly sampled set of valuations. The algorithm decides whether to accept an agent t by comparing the actual realization of V t with the simulated threshold of α(R(Y ) − R(Y ∪ {t})), where α is a constant in (0, 1). α is chosen depending on F to balance the thresholds-for example, if F is the independent sets of a matroid, then α = 1/2 ensures that the thresholds are neither too high nor too low [11] . In the simplest XOS-valuation setting with only item capacity constraints, the difference in residuals decomposes very nicely as a sum of item-prices [8] . It is important, however, that these residuals and prices are always computed based on a prophet who "starts over" and considers every agent 1, . . . , T , even when some agents have already come and gone. Unfortunately, this "starting over" does not exploit the temporal aspect of graph-independence constraints, as illustrated by the following example. Example 1. T agents arrive in order, with agent 1 requesting service for a long interval I 1 = [1, T +1], and each agent t ≥ 2 requesting service for a short interval I t = [t, t + 1/2]. There is a single server, so a set of agents S is feasible if and only if S satisfies constraints (2) . Agent 1 has valuation C+T ε ε with probability ε, and valuation 0 otherwise, where C, ε > 0 are constants. Agents 2, . . . , T deterministically have valuation 1.
Consider the thresholds set by the residual function (4) on Example 1. If no agents have been taken, i.e. Y = ∅, then
Meanwhile, taking any agent t ≥ 2 prevents the prophet from taking agent 1, so R({2}) = . . . = R({T }) = T − 1. 4 Therefore, when Y = ∅, the threshold for agents t ≥ 2 is α(R(∅) − R({t})) = α(C + ε). By setting C = 1/α, we can always construct an instance where these thresholds exceed 1, rejecting all agents 2, . . . , T . The algorithm's welfare is only
C+T ε ε
· ε = C + T ε, while the prophet's welfare is OPT = R(∅) ≈ C + T . By choosing T ≫ C and ε = o(1/T ), the algorithm's welfare can be made an arbitrarily small fraction of OPT.
The residual-based approach 5 performed poorly on Example 1 because the first agent's existence continued to inflate the thresholds of agents 2, . . . , T , even after she had already come and gone. To improve upon it, we incorporate dynamic programming, which is particularly designed to account for these temporal dynamics. Motivated by recent developments in approximate dynamic programming [20, 17] , we consider the following modification to the residual function.
For each agent t, let x * t denote the probability that she is accepted by the prophet, and let y * t denote her expected valuation conditional on being accepted. We then define π t as follows, using backward induction over t = T, T − 1, . . . , 1:
π t can be interpreted as the "cost" of accepting agent t with respect to the graph-independence constraints. Indeed, for all agents t ′ > t, the summand in (5) is the already-computed "surplus" earned by the prophet on agent t ′ , and the sum is over all future surpluses t ′ which are blocked by accepting agent t. Our modified residual function is based on a "restricted" prophet, who sees valuationsV 1 , . . . ,V T that have been reduced in two ways. First, the restricted prophet only sees a non-zero valuation for an agent t if the actual prophet would have accepted t on that sample path (this is formalized in Section 2); otherwise, the agent's valuation is zero. Second, the valuation of every agent t is further reduced by π t , with π t as defined in (5) . Our restricted residual function is then
and we define threshold τ (t|Y ) =
Our algorithm accepts an agent t if and only if she is both feasible and satisfies
Returning to Example 1, we would have π 2 = . . . = π T = 0 (because agents t ≥ 2 do not block any future agents), and π 1 ≈ T − 1. In this case, the matroid is free (because all the constraints are captured by the graph), so τ (t|Y ) = 0 and our algorithm ends up accepting every agent t using decision rule (7), which is the optimal control for Example 1.
In general, τ (t|Y ) represents our price for the matroid and π t represents our price for the graph. π t discriminates based on the agent t, looking at which agents t ′ > t get blocked, but is static in that it does not depend on the current state Y . By contrast, τ (t|Y ) dynamically considers the addition of element t to the current Y , but otherwise does not discriminate based on the agent t. A further contribution of our work is that we show how both τ (t|Y ) and π t can be computed efficiently when G is induced by an intersection of interval-scheduling constraints of the form (2), by implementing an ex-ante relaxation (Section 2.1).
Finally, we describe our analysis, which consists of two steps. First, we show that the algorithm earns at least 1 d1(M)+1R (∅), whereR(∅) represents the welfare of the restricted prophet (Proposition 1). Proposition 1 differs from the original matroid prophet inequality in that the algorithm is further constrained by the graph, but gets to play against a prophet who sees valuationsV t which have been reduced by π t . If the matroid is free and thus d 1 (M ) = 0, then Proposition 1 is still non-trivial, as it says that the algorithm, constrained by the graph, can match the restricted prophet in welfare. Our analysis concludes by showing that the restricted prophet earns at least 1 d2(G)+1 the welfare of the actual prophet (Proposition 2).
A general take-away from our paper is that the way in which constraints are modeled can lead to different algorithms and prophet inequalities. For example, simple constraints on item supplies can be modeled either with a partition matroid or by adding edges to our graph, which results in substantially different algorithms. In general, is there a systematic way of dividing up constraints between feasibility structures to yield the best prophet inequality? We leave this open as interesting future work.
Other Related Work
Prophet inequalities originated in [13, 14] , and the connection to posted-price mechanism design was discovered in [1] . There has since been a surge of literature on prophet inequalities, and we defer a complete literature review to the survey by Lucier [16] . Our work can be classified as having a fixed (adversarial) arrival order, which can be contrasted with random-order prophet inequalities [7] ; general but structured feasible sets, which can be contrasted with arbitrary feasible sets [18] or refined results on rank-1 matroids [3] ; and additive rewards, a special case of combinatorial rewards [19] . Our paper is most related to the existing work involving matroids [11, 6, 5] and XOS valuation functions [8, 5] . We should mention that interval-scheduling constraints have also been studied in [10, 2] , where it is shown that with no assumptions on the intervals, the guarantee relative to the prophet is at most O(log log L/ log L), where L is the length of (number of items in) the longest interval. That is, with no assumptions on the intervals, a constant-factor is impossible.
Finally, we discuss two recent developments in approximate dynamic programming (ADP) from which we borrow techniques. [20] has developed an ADPbased algorithm which is within 1/2 of the optimal DP in an application with reusable resources. This is the motivation behind our interval-scheduling constraints of the form (2). [17] has established a guarantee of 1/(d + 1) in a setting where each item uses up to d resources.
Our work makes further contributions beyond these existing results in three ways. First and most importantly, we show how to include ADP-based thresholds in the matroid residual function and analyze feasible sets defined by the intersection of a matroid and a graph. Second, we unify the two existing ADP results by abstracting them using a graph, which leads to a more general result-we can allow for items to use multiple (up to d) resources, each for a different duration. Finally, we extend their guarantees to be relative to the prophet (instead of the optimal DP), and also show how they can be applied on combinatorial auctions (instead of assortment optimization).
Proof of Theorem 1
We first summarize and formalize the notation and definitions from the Introduction, for the basic setting in Theorem 1. Online Selection Problem. There is a ground set of agents N = {1, . . . , T } with valuations V 1 , . . . , V T drawn independently from marginal distributions F 1 , . . . , F T . There is a matroid M = (N, I) defined on the ground set, where I is a collection of subsets of N satisfying: (i) ∅ ∈ I; (ii) if S ∈ I and S ′ ⊆ S then S ′ ∈ I; and (iii) for S, S ′ ∈ I with |S| > |S ′ |, there exists t ∈ S \ S ′ such that S ′ ∪ {t} ∈ I (we refer to [12] for more background on matroids and their use in optimization). There is also a graph G = (N, E) defined on N , where E is a collection of size-2 subsets of N . We let F denote the collection of feasible sets, where a set of agents S is feasible if it is both independent in the matroid (i.e. S ∈ I) and independent in the graph (i.e. {t, t ′ } / ∈ E for all t, t ′ ∈ S). The goal is to accept a max-value feasible set of agents as compared to a prophet. Prophet. The prophet chooses a joint valuation distribution over R T with marginals F 1 , . . . , F T . On every realization, he sees the valuations and then selects a feasible set of agents. Let x * t denote the probability that agent t is selected, and let y * t denote her expected valuation conditional on being selected. Let OPT denote the prophet's expected welfare, which equals T t=1 y * t x * t , by the linearity of expectation. Furthermore, since on every realization, the prophet's selection must be independent in both the matroid and the graph, the vector x * satisfies
where rank(S) = max S ′ ⊆S,S ′ ∈I |S ′ | denotes the max-cardinality matroid independent set contained within S, and α(G[S]) denotes the max-cardinality graph independent set contained within S. Note that we have relaxed constraints (9) to only a specific family of sets S, which are sufficient for Theorem 1 and computationally simpler. Dynamic Programming Coefficients. Having defined x * t and y * t , we compute
+ by backward induction over t = T, T − 1, . . . , 1, as in (5). We use [·] + to denote the operator max{·, 0}.
We note that such a backward-induction computation is only possible because we have assumed that the arrival order 1, . . . , T is known in advance. Restricted Prophet. The restricted prophet sees valuationsV = (V 1 , . . . ,V T ) drawn according to a joint distributionD defined as follows. First, an independent setÎ in the matroid (which need not be independent in the graph) is randomly selected in a way such that Pr[t ∈Î] = x * t for all t ∈ N (this is possible because x * lies in the matroid polytope defined by (8)-we elaborate in Section 2.1). The restricted prophet then seesV t = y * t − π t if t ∈Î, and V t = −π t otherwise. The residual function (6) based on the restricted prophet iŝ
We note thatR(∅) =
+ . This is because on every realization ofV, the optimal S to take is the set of agents t withV t > 0, which is guaranteed to be independent in the matroid (since all such agents must have hadV t = y * t − π t ). A corollary is that if the graph is empty and π t = 0 for all t, then the restricted prophet earns T t=1 y * t x * t , matching the welfare of the actual prophet despite seeing "binarized" valuationsV t . This reduction was introduced in [15] . Algorithm. The algorithm, having already accepted agents in Y , accepts an agent t if and only if Y ∪ {t} is independent in the graph and V t ≥ τ (t|Y ) + π t , as defined in (7) . Note that τ (t|Y ) =
, and we do not need to explicitly check that Y ∪ {t} is independent in the matroid, because if not, then τ (t|Y ) = ∞. Let ALG denote the expected welfare of this algorithm.
We note that this algorithm requires computing the prophet's values of x * t , y * t , and evaluating expectations over the restricted prophet's correlated distribution D. We ignore computational issues in this section and discuss how the algorithm can be implemented via an ex-ante relaxation in Section 2.1.
We now establish Theorem 1, the conceptual result that the gap between an online algorithm and any prophet is at most ( Proof. Let Y denote the random set of agents accepted at the end of the algorithm, and for all t = 1, . . . , T , let Y t denote Y ∩ {1, . . . , t}, the set of agents accepted up to and including agent t. The algorithm's expected welfare equals (10) where the second equality follows from the definition of τ , and the third equality follows from the fact that Y t−1 ∪ {t} = Y t for all t ∈ Y , causing the latter sum to telescope.
Lemma 1 places an upper bound on the negative term from (10) . It mostly follows from existing results [11, 15] , so its proof is deferred to the appendix. It relies on the submodularity of the matroid residual function. Since our restricted residual function considers a prophet who is only constrained by the matroid, our function is also submodular.
Lemma 2 lower-bounds the "surplus" earned by the algorithm beyond the thresholds τ (t|Y t−1 ), and needs to consider that the algorithm is constrained by both matroid and graph independence. It is novel and crucial to our analysis.
Proof (of Lemma 2). We decompose the LHS as
t∈Y π t and analyze the two expectations separately. The first expectation can be re-written as (11) after using both the linearity of expectation and the tower property of conditional expectation. Now, recall that as agent t arrives, she is accepted if and only if she is feasible (in both the matroid and graph), and V t − τ (t|Y t−1 ) − π t ≥ 0. If Y t−1 ∪ {t} does not form an independent set in the matroid, then τ (t|Y t−1 ) = ∞, sinceR(Y t−1 ∪ {t}) is understood to equal −∞ when the maximization problem in the residual is infeasible. Therefore, we can write
where Feas G (Y t−1 ∪ {t}) is the indicator random variable for Y t−1 ∪ {t} forming an independent set in the graph. Making this substitution for every agent t on the RHS of (11), we get that it equals
where we have used the fact that V t is independent from Y t−1 . Meanwhile, the second expectation can be re-written as
after applying the definition of π t from (5) and switching sums. Now, agent t ′ forms an independent set with Y t ′ −1 in the graph if and only if none of its neighbors t < t ′ have been accepted into Y . Therefore, the sum in parentheses in (13) 
, for all t ′ = 1, . . . , T . Adding (12) and (13), we get that
We argue that both of the terms inside the min{·} operator are at least
+ . For the second term, this is obvious, since the thresholds τ (t|Y t−1 ) are non-negative. For the first term, note that V t takes an average value of y * t on an x * t -fraction of sample paths. Hence by Jensen's inequality, the expectation over V t is at least
+ operator is convex). This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
Equipped with Lemmas 1-2, the proof of Proposition 1 now follows from (10). Indeed, taking an expectation over Y on both sides in the result of Lemma 1, (10) implies that ALG ≥ 
Proof. Recall thatR(∅) =
We apply the definition of π t from (5) and switch sums to derive that
Now, using the fact that the prophet's values of x * t satisfy (9), the sum in parentheses is upper-bounded by α(G[{t < t ′ : {t, t ′ } ∈ E}]) for all t ′ = 1, . . . , T . By Definition 2, all of these values are upper-bounded by d 2 (G). Therefore, since
and rearranging yields
Computing and Constructing the Prophet's Distribution via an Ex-ante Relaxation
In this section we establish computational efficiency assuming that the graph G is induced by d-dimensional interval-scheduling constraints. We use an ex-ante relaxation defined by an LP, and establish three facts:
1. Theorem 1 still holds if we replace the prophet with this ex-ante relaxation, resulting in a guarantee of
Our algorithm based on this ex-ante relaxation is computationally efficient; 3. The ex-ante relaxation upper-bounds the welfare of any prophet.
These facts together show that a computationally-efficient algorithm can earn at least 1 (d1(M)+1)(d+1) the welfare of any prophet.
Definition 3 (d-dimensional Interval-scheduling Constraints).
The agents arrive at times 1, . . . , T to be served by J different resources. Each agent t requests the attention of up to d resources, for different durations of time starting from t. Formally, associated with agent t are intervals {I
where U t is a set of at most d resources, with u j t ≥ t for all j ∈ U t . An agent t can be served only if all of the resources in U t are available. Thus, a set of agents is feasible only if their requested intervals are disjoint for every resource. Agents t, t ′ are adjacent in the graph if I j t ∩ I j t ′ = ∅ for any j. Definition 4 (Discrete Valuations). We assume that the marginal valuations are input as discrete distributions. That is, they are supported over a finite set of K values v 1 , . . . , v K ∈ R, and for each agent t, we let p k t ≥ 0 denote the probability that V t = v k for every k = 1, . . . , K, with k p k t = 1.
Definition 5 (Ex-ante Relaxation). The ex-ante relaxation is defined by an LP.
We then consider the values of x tk from an optimal LP solution and define
for all agents t (where y * t = 0 if x * t = 0).
In the LP, variable x tk can be interpreted as the probability that agent t has valuation v k and is accepted into the feasible set. Note that in an optimal solution, y * t will equal the average value of V t on its top x * t quantile. We now formalize the three facts stated above, with the proofs deferred to the appendix. The second fact references classical results in combinatorial optimization about separation [9] and rounding [4] for the matroid polytope.
Proposition 3 (Fact 1). Our algorithm, when defined based on the values of x * t , y * t from the ex-ante relaxation, has welfare at least
Proposition 4 (Fact 2).
Assuming oracle access to the matroid rank function, the values of x * t , y * t from the ex-ante relaxation can be efficiently computed. Furthermore, the restricted prophet's correlated distributionD has a compact representation which can be efficiently computed.
Proposition 5 (Fact 3).
The expected welfare of any prophet, who can choose the correlation between V 1 , . . . , V T and select a feasible S ∈ F maximizing t∈S V t on every realization, is upper-bounded by the optimal LP value of T t=1 y * t x * t .
Generalization to XOS Combinatorial Auctions
We generalize our result to a setting where each agent has a random valuation function over a set of items, and the graph and matroid constraints are defined on the items. An agent's valuation function is realized upon arrival, and the set of items allocated to the agent must then be decided. Specifically, there are T agents and a set of items N . There is a matroid (N, I) and a graph (N, E) defined over these items, and the total set of items allocated must be both independent in the matroid and the graph. We assume without loss of generality that N is partitioned into N 1 , . . . , N T such that agent t can only be given items in N t .
An allocation is denoted by (
Nt , and let Y t = (Y 1 , . . . , Y t ). Sometimes we abuse notation to assume Y t = Y 1 ∪ · · · ∪ Y t . The set of feasible allocations is
We have similar definitions of d 1 (M ) and
denotes the subgraph of G induced by a set of vertices, and α(·) denotes the maximum size of an independent set in a graph.
Each agent t has a random valuation function v t : 2 Nt → R ≥0 drawn from a known distribution. At time t, agent t's valuation function realizes independently to a valuation function v k t with probability p k t for k = 1, . . . , K. Then, the set of items Y t ⊆ N t allocated to the agent is decided. We require the all valuation functions to be fractionally-subadditive, i.e. XOS (see [8] for a definition).
We now formalize the prophet and algorithm.
Prophet. As before, we compare our online algorithm to a prophet who is able to choose an arbitrary correlated distribution D * over v 1 , . . . , v T . Furthermore, for every realization of the valuation functions v = (v 1 , . . . , v T ), we define the prophet's allocation to be Alloc
which always satisfies
be the conditional probability that the prophet chooses to allocate S ⊆ N t to agent t given that v t realizes to v k t . Then, by linearity of expectation, the prophet's value is
Since the prophet's allocation must be independent in the graph on every realization, for every S = S 1 ∪ · · · ∪ S T ⊆ N , the following must be satisfied:
That is, the number of items in S that is taken must not be greater than the size of the biggest independent set in the graph induced by S. By taking expectations, we get:
where OPT is the expected welfare of a prophet who can choose the correlation between v 1 , . . . , v T and see their realizations beforehand.
The proof of Theorem 2 is deferred to Appendix C. Below, we also generalize Definition 3, and bound d 2 (G) in the setting where every item i ∈ N requests the attention of up to d resources for a duration of time. When combined, these results imply a 1 (d1(M)+1)(d+1) -guarantee. Proposition 6. Let J be a set of resources, and let U i ⊆ J for every i ∈ N with |U i | ≤ d. Associated with every item i ∈ N t are intervals {I A Why weakly balanced prices do not exist for Example 1
We explain why even the most general framework from [5] , which seeks weakly balanced prices in a deterministic setting, does not appear to yield a constantfactor guarantee for Example 1. The reasoning is similar to that described in Section 1.2, with the issue caused by the optimum "starting over". Consider Theorem 3.2 from [5] and consider any constants α, β 1 , and β 2 . We construct values of T , C, and ε for which their algorithm based on balanced prices extracts an arbitrary-small fraction of welfare. We will follow the notation from Section 3 of [5] .
For every agent t, the corresponding outcome space is {∅, acc}, where acc refers to agent t being accepted while ∅ refers to agent t being rejected. Let x be the allocation in which only the second agent is accepted. Suppose v is the valuation profile where the first agent has valuation C+T ε ε , which occurs with probability ε. In this case, v(ALG(v)) = C+T ε ε , since the prophet only allocates the item to the first agent. Then, F x (the exchange-compatible set) cannot contain any allocation y that accepts the first agent, because if it did, then it would not satisfy (y 1 , x −1 ) ∈ F . Therefore, it must be that v(OPT(v, F x )) ≤ T − 1. Then, for x and v to satisfy the first constraint in weakly balanced prices, it must be that
Their posted price mechanism uses prices δ·E v [p v i (x i |y)] for δ = 1 β1+max{2β2,1/α} , and the aforementioned valuation function realizes with probability ε. Therefore, the price for agent 2 in the posted price mechanism is greater than
Similarly, the price for agents i = 3, . . . , T will also be greater than 1, so those agents will never be accepted. Then, the posted-price mechanism will achieve welfare C + T ε, whereas the prophet will achieve C + T − 1 + ε. As T → ∞ and ε = o(1/T ), the fraction of welfare achieved by the posted-price mechanism goes to 0.
B Deferred Proofs
Proof (of Lemma 1). The residual functionR, which involves the prophet selecting a max-value independent set in a matroid, is submodular by [11] . That is, for all subsets S and S ′ ,R(S ∪ S ′ ) +R(S ∩ S ′ ) ≤R(S) +R(S ′ ). Applying this inequality repeatedly yields the following:
Therefore, we can rearrange (21) to get
Now, recall that eachV t takes value y * t − π t with probability x * t , and value −π t otherwise. Without the constraint that S ∪ Y ∈ I, the RHS of (22) would equal
+ . Therefore, the RHS of (22) can be at most this value, completing the proof.
Proof (of Proposition 3).
Our algorithm and analysis from Theorem 1 only required that the values of x * t satisfy (8)- (9) , and that y * t corresponds to the average value of V t on an x * t -fraction of sample paths. We verify that all of this is still true for the ex-ante's values of x * t , y * t . (8) follows immediately from LP constraint (14) and the definition of x * t . To check (9) , consider any t = 1, . . . , T and S = {t ′ < t : {t, t ′ } ∈ E}. An agent t ′ < t can only be adjacent to t if there exists j ∈ U t ∩U t ′ such that interval I j t ′ ∋ t, i.e. agent t ′ lapses time t on resource j. Therefore, S can be partitioned into |U t | sets where the agents t ′ in each set all lapse time t on some resource j. By LP constraint (15) , the sum of values of x * t ′ for the agents t ′ in the same set is at most 1. Therefore, t ′ ∈S x * t ′ ≤ |U t |. Since |U t | ≤ d for all agents t, constraints (9) hold with the RHS replaced by d. The proof of Theorem 1 (specifically, that of Proposition 2) holds with max t α(G[{t
Finally, y * t equals the average value of V t on its top x * t quantile, which can be directly checked from its definition and the fact that x tk was an optimal LP solution. Therefore, we can invoke Theorem 1 to complete the proof.
Proof (of Proposition 4).
The LP is polynomially-sized except for the exponential family of constraints (14) . This family of constraints define the matroid polytope and can be efficiently separated over, assuming oracle access to the matroid rank function (note that this is a submodular function minimization problem). Furthermore, using the GLS ellipsoid method, separation implies that the LP can be solved to optimality and hence the vectors x * , y * can be computed. For further background on these results, we refer to [12, Sec. 14.3] and [9] .
Since x * lies in the matroid polytope defined by (8) , which is integral [12, Sec. 13.4], x * can indeed be represented by a distribution over independent sets. Furthermore, there are explicit rounding procedures for doing so, which can compute a small convex combination of independent sets equaling x * assuming an oracle to the matroid [4] (note that a convex representation with at most T +1 sets exists, by Caratheodory's theorem [12, Sec. 3] ). Therefore, the restricted prophet's distributionD has small support and can be explicitly constructed in polynomial time, which allows us to efficiently evaluate the expectation overV in the definition of the residualR, and hence efficiently run our algorithm.
Proof (of Proposition 5).
Consider any correlated distribution for V 1 , . . . , V T and prophet selection rule. Set x tk to be the probability that the prophet accepts agent t when her valuation realizes to v k , for all t and k. We argue that this forms a feasible solution to the LP. The constraints (14)- (15) follow from the linearity of expectation, since the prophet must select a set that is independent in both the matroid and the graph on every realization (note that the edges in the graph are defined so that that the interval constraints (15) are indeed satisfied by the {0, 1}-incidence vector of any independent set in the graph). Meanwhile, x tk ≤ p k t because the marginal probability that the valuation of agent t is v k is at most p k t . Finally, the objective value of the LP equals the expected welfare of the prophet. Since the prophet corresponds to a feasible LP solution, the optimal LP solution can be no less, completing the proof.
Proof (of Proposition 6). Let G = (N, E) be the graph where {i, i ′ } ∈ E if I j i ∩ I j i ′ = ∅ for any resource j. Then, an item i ∈ N t can be allocated if and only if none of its neighbors are allocated. Therefore, a set of items is independent in the graph if and only if it is a feasible allocation.
We show d 2 (G) ≤ d. Consider any i ∈ N t , and let S = {i ′ ∈ N t ′ : {i, i ′ } ∈ E, t ′ < t} be the neighbors of i that come before time t that "blocks" i. We must show that the largest independent set in the graph G[S] contains at most d nodes. Since every neighbor of i uses at least one resource in common with i, we can partition S into |U i | sets based on which resource they have in common. (If a neighbor has more than one resource in common with i, then choose one of the resources at random.) Each set in the partition form a clique in the graph, since they all share a resource in common and their intervals overlap at time t. Therefore, an independent set in the graph G[S] can contain at most one item from each of the sets in the partition. Thus, α(G[S]) ≤ |U i | ≤ d.
C Proof of Theorem 2
The proof structure is similar to that of Theorem 1. Propositions 7 and 8 are analogous to Propositions 1 and 2, respectively. Lemmas 3 and 4 also correspond to Lemmas 1 and 2. Proof. Let Y t ⊆ N t be the random variable corresponding to the set of items allocated to agent t by the algorithm, and let Y t = Y 1 ∪ · · · ∪ Y t . The algorithm's expected welfare equals
where the second equality follows from the definition of τ , and the third equality follows from the fact that Y t−1 ∪ Y t = Y t for all t, causing the latter sum to telescope. 
Proof (of Lemma 3).

R(Y
Fix any J = (J 1 , . . . , J T ) such that J ∪ Y T ∈ I. The residual functionR is submodular by [11] . That is, for all subsets S and S ′ ,R(S ∪ S ′ ) +R(S ∩ S ′ ) ≤ R(S) +R(S ′ ). Applying this inequality repeatedly yields the following: 
